The Formation of GM-free and GM Coasean clubs

Maarten Punt and Justus Wesseler

No 212711, 2015 Conference, August 9-14, 2015, Milan, Italy from International Association of Agricultural Economists

Abstract: The unintended presence of traces of genetically modified (GM) crops in the harvests of conventional crops plays a prominent role in the debate over the coexistence of GM and conventional crops. One way to address the issue is the formation of GM-free or GM-only clubs. We model the decisions of individual farmers to cultivate either GM or conventional crops and combine this with a game theoretic model of club formation to investigate the feasibility of clubs. We consider two liability regimes: GM farmers are liable or they are not. We also consider two benchmarks: Nash equilibrium without negotiations and the efficient configuration as well as partial cooperation through Coasean clubs. We find that relatively large clubs can form but they are not always necessary.

Keywords: Crop Production/Industries; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-pr~
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:iaae15:212711

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.212711

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