International Strategic Agricultural Trade Policy Interdependence and the Exchange Rate: A Game Theoretical Analysis

P. Lynn Kennedy, Harald von Witzke and Terry Roe

No 198198, 1997 Occasional Paper Series No. 7 from International Association of Agricultural Economists

Abstract: International strategic agricultural trade policy interdependence is modelled using a game theoretical framework. The model distinguishes between the European Community, the United States and a politically passive rest-of-the-world. Particular emphasis is placed on the effect of the exchange rate on the equilibrium outcome of this game.

Keywords: International Relations/Trade; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:iaaeo7:198198

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.198198

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