Quality Provision and Governance Structure Variety: Pooling versus double markup

Qiao Liang, George W.J. Hendrikse and Zuhui Huang

No 90805, 2010 IAMO Forum, June 16-18, 2010, Halle (Saale), Germany from Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO)

Abstract: This paper examines how farmers producing differentiated quality products choose different governance structures in a non-cooperative game between farmers, enterprises, and consumers. A cooperative and an IOF (investor owned firm) coexist in equilibrium and low quality is delivered by the cooperative. The trade-off between pooling and the elimination of the double markup determines the attractiveness of cooperatives compared to IOFs.

Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:iamo10:90805

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.90805

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