GALE-SHAPLEY MATCHING IN AN EVOLUTIONARY TRADE NETWORK GAME

Leigh Tesfatsion ()

No 18200, Economic Reports from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: For a postscript copy of this paper, click here. This study investigates the performance of Gale-Shapley matching in an evolutionary market context. Computational experimental findings are reported for an evolutionary match-and-play trade network game in which resource-constrained traders repeatedly choose and refuse trade partners in accordance with Gale-Shapley matching, participate in risky trades modelled as two-person prisoner's dilemma games, and evolve their trade behavior over time. Particular attention is focused on correlations between ex ante market structure and the formation of trade networks, and between trade network formation and the types of trade behavior and social welfare outcomes that these trade networks support.

Keywords: International; Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40
Date: 1998
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/18200/files/er43.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Gale-Shapley Matching in an Evolutionary Trade Network Game (1998)
Working Paper: Gale-Shapley Matching in an Evolutionary Trade Network Game (1998)
Working Paper: Gale-Shapley Matching in an Evolutionary Trade Network Game (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:iowaer:18200

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.18200

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