Ascending Bid Auctions with Behaviorally Consistent Bidders

Edi Karni and Zvi Safra

No 275437, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
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Working Paper: ASCENDING BID AUCTIONS WITH BEHAVIORALLY CONSISTENT BIDDERS (1988)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275437

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275437

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