A Neo2Bayesian Foundation of the Maximin Value for Two-Person Zero- Sum Games

Sergiu Hart, Salvatore Modica and David Schmeidler

No 275500, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: A joint derivation of utility and value for two-person zero-sum games is obtained using a decision theoretic approach. Acts map states to consequences. The latter are lotteries over prizes, and the set of states is a product of two finite sets (m rows and n columns). Preferences over acts are complete, transitive, continuous, monotonic and certainty-independent (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), and satisfy a new axiom of strategic flexibility which we introduce. These axioms are shown to characterize preferences such that (i) the induced preferences on consequences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, and (ii) each act is ranked according to the maxmin value of the corresponding m x n utility matrix (a two-person zero-sum game). An alternative statement of the result deals simultaneously with all finite two-person zero-sum games in the framework of conditional acts and preferences.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 1990-11
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275500/files/TEL-AVIV-FSWP-170.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A NEO BAYESIAN FOUNDATION OF THE MAXMIN VALUE FOR TWO- PERSON ZERO-SUM GAMES (1990)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275500

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275500

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