Experimentation in a Duopoly

Arthur Fishman and Neil Gandal

No 275559, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: The existing literature on optimal learning confines attention to the costs and benefits of experimentation when there is a single decision maker. In this paper, we consider equilibrium learning in an imperfectly competitive setting. The novel feature of the competitive setting is that experimentation involves strategic costs that are not present in the monopoly context. Using a simple model, we show that competition can inhibit the scope of learning, relative to a monopoly.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17
Date: 1992-03
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Working Paper: Experimentation in a Duopoly (1992)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275559

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275559

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