Imperfect Competition in a Market of an Exhaustible Resource

Gideon Fishelson

No 275563, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: In this paper we study the paths of market prices and the extracted quantities of an exhaustible resource when the market ownership of the mines is of imperfect competition. The major part of the study is devoted to the Cournot—Nash case, with minor extensions to a Stackelberg duopoly and a cooperation between the two firms. The unique characteristics of the study is of perfect common property of the resource and perfect substitution of the rate of extraction and cummulative extraction in the costs of mining of each of the firms. If corner solutions are not a priori encountered, then the typical static characteristics are maintained also in the dynamic case.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Marketing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 1992-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275563/files/TEL-AVIV-FSWP-200.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275563

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275563

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().