When does it take a Nixon to go to China?

Alex Cukierman and Mariano Tommasi

No 275627, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: Substantial changes in policy are sometimes implemented by "unlikely" parties; for example, radical market-oriented reforms by populist parties and substantial steps towards peace by "hawks" like Begin or Nixon. To account for such episodes, we develop a framework in which incumbent politicians have more information than the voting public about the state of the world, and hence about which policies are optimal. Politicians are unable to transmit fully this information, since there is also incomplete information about their preferences. We conclude that popular support for a policy, or its "credibility," depends on the policymakerpolicy pair.

Keywords: Financial Economics; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47
Date: 1997-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275627/files/TEL-AVIV-FSWP-264.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China? (1998)
Working Paper: When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China (1997)
Working Paper: Why Does it Take a Nixon to go to China? (1995)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275627

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275627

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