The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study

Ayala Arad

No 275711, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: The paper introduces a new allocation game, related to the Colonel Blotto game: each tennis coach assigns his four different skilled players to four positions, and then each team plays all other teams in the tournament. The set of equilibria is characterized and experimental behavior in variants of the game is analyzed in light of an adapted level-k model. The results exhibit a systematic pattern- a majority of the subjects used a small number of strategies. However, although level-k thinking is naturally specified in this context, only a limited use of low level-k thinking was found. Thus, the results illuminate some bounds of the level-k approach.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Research Methods/Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41
Date: 2008-09
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275711

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275711

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