Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Applied Work

Chaim Fershtman and Ariel Pakes

No 275718, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: With applied work in mind, we define an equilibrium notion for dynamic games with assymetric information which does not require a specification for players’ beliefs about their opponents types. This enables us to define equilibrium conditions which, at least in principal, are testable and can be computed using a simple reinforcement learning algorithm. We conclude with an example that endogenizes the maintenance decisions for electricity generators in a dynamic game among electric utilities in which the costs states of the generators are private information.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45
Date: 2008-11
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Related works:
Working Paper: Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Applied Work (2009)
Working Paper: Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Applied Work (2009)
Working Paper: Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Applied Work (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275718

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275718

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