Search and Work in Optimal Welfare Programs

Nicola Pavoni, Ofer Setty and Giovanni L. Violante

No 275749, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: Actual welfare programs often feature work requirements in exchange for benefits and job-search assistance. We study the optimal design of welfare programs for the unemployed when the principal/ government can solicit either job-search effort or work effort from the agent or, alternatively, can relieve the agent from supplying effort and search on her behalf. Our main result is that when the generosity of the welfare program (i.e., its initial promised utility) is low, then the optimal program should be based on work activities. In contrast, when the initial generosity, or available budget, is high the optimal program should be based on search —and search assistance— activities.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Labor and Human Capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275749/files/11-2011.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Search and Work in Optimal Welfare Programs (2013)
Working Paper: Search and Work in Optimal Welfare Programs (2013)
Working Paper: Search and Work in Optimal Welfare Programs (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275749

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275749

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().