A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent
Jacob Glazer and
Ariel Rubinstein ()
No 275764, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research
Abstract:
A new model of mechanism design with a boundedly rational agent is studied. A speaker presents a request to a listener who would like to accept the request only if certain conditions are met by the speaker’s true case. This persuasion situation is modeled as a leader-follower relationship. The listener first announces and commits to a persuasion rule, i.e. a set of conditions to be satisfied by the case in order for him to be persuaded. Then, the speaker presents a case, though not necessarily the true one. The speaker is boundedly rational in the sense that his ability to come up with a persuasive case is limited and depends on the true case and on the persuasion rule and the way in which it is framed. We fully characterize the circumstances under which the listener’s goal can be achieved.
Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2012-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275764/files/2-2012.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents (2012) 
Working Paper: A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent (2011) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275764
DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275764
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