A Case for Maximum Wage

Tomer Blumkin, Efraim Sadka and Yotam Shem-Tov

No 275790, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: In this paper we demonstrate that supplementing the optimal non-linear income tax system with a binding maximum wage rule attains a Pareto improvement, by serving to mitigate the mimicking incentives of the high-skill individuals without entailing distortions.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Labor and Human Capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 2013-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275790

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275790

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