A Model of Boundedly Rational “Neuro” Agents

Kfir Eliaz and Ariel Rubinstein ()

No 275832, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: We propose a simple model in which a boundedly rational agent observes not only the choices made by others, but also some information about the process that led them to those choices. We consider two cases: In the first, an agent observes whether another agent has compared the alternatives before making his choice. In the second, he also observes whether the decision was hasty. It is shown that the probability of making a mistake is higher in the second case and that the existence of these non-standard “neuro” observations systematically biases the equilibrium distribution of choices.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Research Methods/Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: A model of boundedly rational “neuro” agents (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275832

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275832

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