Joint Bidding in Conservation Auctions: An Experimental Study of Policy Design and Performance

Simanti Banerjee

No 413374, Cornhusker Economics from University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Department of Agricultural Economics

Abstract: This study is one of the few to focus on the impact of joint bidding on conservation auction performance. With a few caveats, results indicate that the nature of incentives associated with rewarding spatial coordination in the first place will influence the environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency of conservation auction-based policies with joint bidding. This study is a context-neutral laboratory experiment with university students and provides evidence regarding the internal theoretical validity of the mechanism being studied. However, the findings will require further testing both in controlled and context-rich settings with producer participants before any informed policy recommendations can be made.

Keywords: Agricultural; and; Food; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/413374/files/AES_2021-07-14.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:nbaece:413374

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.413374

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cornhusker Economics from University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Department of Agricultural Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().