Motives for the International Licensing of Branded Food and Related Products

Ian M. Sheldon and Dennis R. Henderson

No 233054, Occasional Papers from Regional Research Project NC-194: Organization and Performance of World Food Systems

Abstract: Given initial empirical observations of international licensing of, food and beer brands, this paper presents a simple game-theoretic model of the motives for licensing. In a situation of complete information, the model suggests that imperfect competition in overseas markets may be an important determinant of a branded product licensing equilibrium, whilst incomplete information about incumbent firms' payoffs and strategies and also repetition of the game may generate a sequence of unsuccessful entry followed by licensing.

Keywords: Agricultural; and; Food; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 1990-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:nc194o:233054

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.233054

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