Political Institutions and International Patterns of Agricultural Protection

John Beghin () and Mylene Kherallah

No 259512, Archive from North Carolina State University, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the influence of political systems and rights in patterns of agricultural protection across commodities, countries and over time. Four political systems (dictatorship, one-party, dominant party, democracy) and an index of political rights account for differences in political institutions. The analysis also incorporates the effects of development, of constraints on tax collection feasibility, and of comparative advantages and terms of trade. Pluralistic systems are associated with higher agricultural protection levels, although in a nonlinear fashion. Access to pluralism appears to be important, although further democratization {from dominant party system to democracy) does not induce more distortions.

Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25
Date: 1991-04-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political Institutions and International Patterns of Agricultural Protection (1994)
Working Paper: Political Institutions and International Patterns of Agricultural Protection (1994)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ncarar:259512

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.259512

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