Regional Fishery Management Organization as Games in Coalitional Form

Kim Hang Pham Do and Henk Folmer ()

No 97792, 2004 Conference, June 25-26, 2004, Blenheim, New Zealand from New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society

Abstract: This paper examines how a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) might successfully achieve effective control of a high seas fishery in the context of partial cooperation. We analyse the feasible allocations of property rights among members of a given RFMO and coalitions of potential entrants. We demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from both partial and full cooperations.

Keywords: Agribusiness; Crop Production/Industries; Environmental Economics and Policy; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
Date: 2004-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:nzar04:97792

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.97792

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