Fishery Management Games: How to reduce effort and admit new members

Kim Hang Pham Do, Henk Folmer () and Henk Norde

No 31964, 2006 Conference, August 24-25, 2006, Nelson, New Zealand from New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society

Abstract: This paper addresses the two main problems that Regional Fishery Management Organizations face. First, how to induce independent nations to reduce their fishing efforts from the competitive equilibrium to prevent the fish stock from extinction or to increase profits. We argue that adjustment from the Nash equilibrium to a state of sustainable yield can be achieved by means of the proportional rule without harming any of the countries involved. Next we propose the population monotonic allocation scheme as management rule for the second problem: the division of profits within an

Keywords: Resource; /Energy; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:nzasin:31964

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.31964

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