Collusion and Price Dispersion
John Connor ()
No 28639, Staff Papers from Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics
While there are suggestions in applied cartel studies that price dispersion changes when cartelization of a market occurs, there are few theoretical or empirical analyses of this effect. This paper surveys the thin economic literature on the link between overt collusion and price dispersion. Formal theories and observation of cartel behavior suggest that during successfully collusive periods prices become less variable and more negatively skewed compared to relatively competitive periods. Four empirical studies of cartels verify these predictions.
Keywords: Agribusiness; Demand and Price Analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Collusion and price dispersion (2005)
Working Paper: COLLUSION AND PRICE DISPERSION (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:puaesp:28639
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