A good opening: the key to make the most of unilateral climate action

Valentina Bosetti and Enrica De Cian

No 331957, Conference papers from Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project

Abstract: We examine the reaction of non-signatory countries to partial cooperation on climate change. Although freeriding incentives lead countries that do not participate in the environmental agreement to increase their emissions, under some conditions technology advancements within the coalition spill over to non-signatories and induce them to reduce, rather than increase, their emissions. We investigate these conditions analytically, using a Stackelberg game, and numerically, using a calibrated integrated assessment model. Results indicate that if a partial coalition, composed of OECD countries, cooperates to reduce their 2050 emissions between 30 and 35% below 2005 levels, the technology effect would prevail. This suggests that cooperating countries can strategically choose their unilateral climate objective so as to induce a virtuous behaviour in non-signatories countries. Interestingly, in the short-run these reductions are comparable with the Copenhagen pledges for Annex I countries. Conversely, had the OECD coalition embraced a more demanding target (e.g. 2050 emissions 50% below their 2005 levels), then the leakage effect would prevail and nonsignatories would erode the coalition’s environmental effectiveness. To mitigate the risk of carbon leakage associated with more ambitious targets, credible future commitments for developing countries could be set, as they would reduce lock-in in carbon intense technologies.

Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource/Energy Economics and Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52
Date: 2010
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Related works:
Journal Article: A Good Opening: The Key to Make the Most of Unilateral Climate Action (2013)
Working Paper: A Good Opening: The Key to Make the Most of Unilateral Climate Action (2011)
Working Paper: A Good Opening: The Key to Make the Most of Unilateral Climate Action (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:pugtwp:331957

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