The Control of Land Rent in the Fortified Farming Town

John Hartwick

No 273572, Queen's Economics Department Working Papers from Queen's University - Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider costly administration at the center of a farming community surrounding a fortied village. Land rent taxation is high cost mode of nancing central administration in a tax incidence sense. Participatory administration by the governed is a lower cost alternative. We speculate why the low cost option has been out-competed by its higher cost alternative throughout history. We also take up constraints on predation on farmers by a landlord at the center.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Land Economics/Use (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
Date: 2006-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:quedwp:273572

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273572

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