Bargaining and Voting

Dan Usher

No 273744, Queen's Economics Department Working Papers from Queen's University - Department of Economics

Abstract: Government by majority rule voting requires that compromise be attainable, but not too easily. Little of the nation’s business could be transacted without an ability on the part of the legislators and political parties to strike bargains, but government by majority rule voting could not withstand a bargaining equilibrium comparable to the general equilibrium in a competitive economy. Democratic government is designed to foster bargaining where it should be fostered and to impede bargaining where it should be impeded.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2010-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining and voting (2012)
Working Paper: Bargaining And Voting (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:quedwp:273744

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273744

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