Smuggling and Parallel Markets for Exports

Scott Fausti

No 232224, Economics Staff Papers from South Dakota State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper proposes a model of smuggling consistent with the coexistence of firms involved in strictly legal trade with firms involved in smuggling. A framework is presented in which a firm's degree of risk aversion and the level of government enforcement are the determining factors in the decision of the firm to smuggle or not to smuggle. The model demonstrates that smuggling must be welfare enhancing or all smuggling activity will end. This paper also provides a theoretical analysis of the effect enforcement has on smuggling and welfare. Increased enforcement is shown to have a negative effect on welfare. Government enforcement is assumed to have two policy instruments it can use to combat smuggling: l} the probability of detection; 2} the monetary penalty. The relative effectiveness of government enforcement instruments in deterring smuggling is shown to be dependent on the degree of firm risk aversion.

Keywords: International Relations/Trade; Marketing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44
Date: 1991-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:sdsusp:232224

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.232224

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