Engineering an incentive to search for work: A comparison groups approach

Oded Stark, Marcin Jakubek and Martina Kobus

No 204865, Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF)

Abstract: Social comparisons are important in the employment sphere. A “culture of unemployment” may evolve and prevail because it is optimal for an individual to remain unemployed when other unemployed individuals constitute his main reference group. We advance the idea that by making the receipt of unemployment benefits conditional on engagement in an incentive-enhancing activity (for example, work under state-sponsored employment schemes or participation in work-site-based training programs), a government can engineer a revision of the reference groups of an unemployed individual in order to induce him to seek work.

Keywords: Labor and Human Capital; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13
Date: 2015-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm
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Journal Article: Engineering an incentive to search for work: A comparison groups approach (2015)
Working Paper: Engineering an incentive to search for work: A comparison groups approach (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ubzefd:204865

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.204865

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