The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy After EMU

Barry Eichengreen

No 233176, Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers from University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper considers the implications for fiscal policy of European Monetary Unification. Following an introduction, Section II describes and critiques the fiscal provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union. Section III considers the case for formal fiscal restraints and presents evidence on their effectiveness. Section IV presents a parallel analysis of the debate over fiscal federalism.

Keywords: Political; Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38
Date: 1992-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Working Paper: The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy After EMU (1992)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ucbewp:233176

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.233176

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