EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Trade as Engine of Political Change: A Parable

Alessandra Casella

No 233188, Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers from University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics

Abstract: If efficient economic activity requires appropriate public goods, then changes in the volume and flow of trade will induce changes in the demand for these public goods. In general, if people disagree over their preferred levels of public goods, the expansion of trade may affect the structure of jurisdictions responsible for their provision. This paper presents a simple example meant to illustrate the general principle. It studies a general equilibrium model where the size of the market is easily parametrized and welfare depends on private exchange and two public goods. Preferences over one of them are heterogenous, but administrative costs initially make the formation of two separate jurisdictions too expensive. However, as the market expands, reliance on the public goods increases and with it the importance of having access to the correct public good. A federal system becomes optimal when the market is sufficiently large.

Keywords: International; Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 1993-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/233188/files/cal-cider-c093-012.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Trade as an Engine of Political Change. A Parable (1993) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ucbewp:233188

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.233188

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers from University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:ags:ucbewp:233188