ECONOMICS OF TARIFF-RATE QUOTA ADMINISTRATION

David W. Skully

No 33576, Technical Bulletins from United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service

Abstract: The 1996 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture was a step toward free trade. The Agreement lifts bans and quotas on imports, but allows their conversion into tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), which function like quotas. At present, many of the 1,300 TRQs increased market access to imports, but some have preserved pre-Agreement levels of protection. The World Trade Organization's intent as to the administration of TRQs is open to interpretation. This report analyzes seven administrative methods in light of the principle of nondiscrimination. We conclude that auctions are the best way to administer a TRQ. First-come, first-served and license-on-demand methods present a moderate risk of biased trade. State trading organizations and producer groups that directly administer TRQs can also bias trade. Historical allocation is the method most likely to be discriminatory. Two case studies illustrate our conclusion.

Keywords: International; Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uerstb:33576

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.33576

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