Private Responses to Public Incentives for Invasive Species Management
Ram Ranjan and
Edward Evans ()
No 15645, Working Papers from University of Florida, International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center
In this paper the impact of public policies such as subsidies and taxation on invasive species management is explored in a Markov chain framework. Private agents react to public incentives based upon their long term expected profits and have the option of taking measures such as abatement, monitoring and reporting. Conditions for perverse incentives are derived. The impact of sequencing of taxation and subsides on spread of risks if explored. One key finding of this paper is that excessive regulation may exacerbate the invasive species problem.
Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Private Responses to Public Incentives for Invasive Species Management (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uflowp:15645
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