Innovation and Antibiotic Use within Antibiotic Classes: Market Incentives and Economic Instruments

Markus Herrmann, Bruno Nkuiya () and Anne-Renée Dussault

No 149731, Working Papers from University of Laval, Center for Research on the Economics of the Environment, Agri-food, Transports and Energy (CREATE)

Abstract: We analyze a monopolist’s incentive to innovate a new antibiotic which is connected to the same pool of antibiotic treatment efficacy as is another drug produced by a generic industry. We outline the differences of antibiotic use under market conditions and in the social optimum. A time and state-dependent tax-subsidy mechanism is proposed to induce the monopolist and generic industry to exploit antibiotic efficacy optimally.

Keywords: Health; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ino
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Innovation and antibiotic use within antibiotic classes: Market incentives and economic instruments (2013)
Working Paper: Innovation and Antibiotic Use within Antibiotic Classes: Market Incentives and Economic Instruments (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ulavwp:149731

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.149731

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