WATER INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO AMELIORATE MARKET AND GOVERNMENT FAILURES

K. Easter and Gershon Feder

No 14217, Staff Papers from University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics

Abstract: At the macro level, the way water resources are managed results in major misallocations as well as quality deterioration. It has become apparent in many cases that current practices and policies are not sustainable, and that reforms are needed. The present paper focuses on some of these reforms. It starts by reviewing and analyzing the sources of the market failures as well as government failures in water resources management. Recognizing the inevitability and desirability of some form of public action in many circumstances, it seeks to identify forms of interventions that utilize, to the extent possible, individual or private incentives by providing the institutional and legal framework in which these incentives can best complement the interventions. Examples from various countries are provided to illustrate the feasibility and merits of the proposed reforms.

Keywords: Resource/Energy; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39
Date: 1996
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/14217/files/p96-14.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:umaesp:14217

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.14217

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Staff Papers from University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().