INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: INCENTIVES FOR NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL: AN APPROACH BASED ON A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL

Cesar Dosi and Michele Moretto

No 297347, Staff Papers from University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics

Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44
Date: 1991-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/297347/files/p91-24-002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:umaesp:297347

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.297347

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Staff Papers from University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().