An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets
John Stranlund (),
James Murphy () and
John Spraggon ()
No 93966, Working Paper Series from University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Department of Resource Economics
Two important design elements for emission trading programs are whether and to what extent firms are able to bank emissions permits, and how these programs are to be enforced. In this paper we present results from laboratory emissions markets designed to investigate enforcement and compliance when these markets allow permit banking. Banking is motivated by a decrease in the aggregate permit supply in the middle of multi-period trading sessions. Consistent with theoretical insights, our experiments suggest that high permit violation penalties have little deterrence value in dynamic emissions markets, and that the main challenge of enforcing these programs is to motivate truthful self-reports of emissions.
Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: An experimental analysis of compliance in dynamic emissions markets (2011)
Working Paper: An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets (2011)
Working Paper: An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:umamwp:93966
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Paper Series from University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Department of Resource Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().