Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction, Not Grandfather

Peter Cramton and Suzi Kerr

No 197846, Working Papers from University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Keywords: Crop Production/Industries; Resource/Energy Economics and Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 1998-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/197846/files/agecon-maryland-98-01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Tradeable carbon permit auctions: How and why to auction not grandfather (2002)
Working Paper: Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather (2002)
Working Paper: Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather (1998)
Working Paper: Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:umdrwp:197846

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.197846

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