The GATT Negotiations and US/EC Agricultural Policies Solutions to Noncooperative Games

Martin Johnson, Terry Roe and Louis Adrien Pascal Mahe

No 7491, Bulletins from University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center

Abstract: Countries cooperate in negotiating treaties. However, treaty compliance is noncooperative; signatories comply with treaties only if compliance leaves them better off than noncompliance. US and EC agricultural policies of 1986 are modeled through a noncooperative game. Bilateral treaties, formalizations of Nash Equilibria, are presented which improve US and EC welfare.

Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:umedbu:7491

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.7491

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