Games without Rules

Flavio Menezes and John Quiggin

No 151166, Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers from University of Queensland, School of Economics

Abstract: We introduce the notion of an outcome space, in which strategic interactions are embedded. This allows us to investigate the idea that one strategic interaction might be an expanded version of another interaction. We then characterize the Nash equilibria arising in such extensions and demonstrate a folk-type theorem stating that any individually rational element of the outcome space is a Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2004-07-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: Games without Rules (2007)
Working Paper: Games without Rules (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uqsers:151166

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.151166

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