HUMAN CAPITAL AND SELF-ENFORCING CONTRACTS
Costas Azariadis ()
No 268330, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics
This essay analyzes labor contracts as a device for rearranging factor incomes over time when the lack of verifiable public information about future compensation prevents finitely-lived workers from borrowing against their earnings. Specific human capital is used as an incentive to implement intertemporal self-enforcing contracts between workers and firms. I propose a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such contracts, explore the resulting equilibrium earnings profiles, and investigate how imperfections in the credit market influence the way workers allocate time between current production and training.
Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; Labor and Human Capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:268330
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