Learning in Elections and Voter Turnout Equilibria

Stefano DeMichelis and Amrita Dhillon ()

No 269378, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: Both complete and incomplete game Theoretic Models of Voter Turnout (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983,1985) have the problem of multiple equilibria, some of which seem unreasonable. How can the counter intuitive high turnout equilibria be explained? Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) suggest that the main reason is that strategic uncertainty is too low in a com- plete information model. We show that this is not the main problem with these equilibria{ incomplete information may exacerbate the problem of multiple equilibria. We propose a very intuitive criterion based on voter learning to distinguish reasonable equilibria. This paper makes precise the sense in which the high turnout equilibria in the Palfrey-Rosenthal model are not robust. We show how the model can be used to qualitatively explain several phenomena observed in reality.

Keywords: Political Economy; Public Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2001-09-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269378

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269378

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