Imitation and the emergence of Nash equilibrium play in games with many players

Edward Cartwright

No 269568, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: We model a learning dynamic in which players imitate and innovate. Of interest is to question whether Nash equilibrium play emerges, and if so, the role that imitation plays in this emergence. Our main result provides a general class of coordination game for which approximate Nash equilibrium play does emerge. Important conditions include that players imitate ‘similar’ individuals. The role of imitation in learning is discussed in the context of two examples where it is shown that imitation can lead to Pareto superior outcomes.

Keywords: Public Economics; Research Methods/Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 2003-10-10
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Working Paper: Imitation and the Emergence of Nash Equilibrium Play in Games with Many Players (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269568

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269568

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