Decentralized Job matching

Guillaume Haeringer and Myrna Wooders

No 269572, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies a decentralized job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfilled propose to other candidates. We distinguish between several cases, depending on whether agents’ actions are simultaneous and/or irreversible (if a worker accepts an offer he is immediately matched, and both the worker and the firm to which she is matched go out of the market). For all these cases, we provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium outcomes and the Subgame Perfect equilibria. While the set of Nash equilibria outcomes contain all individually rational matchings, it turns out that in most cases considered all subgame perfect equilibria yield a unique outcome, the worker-optimal matching.

Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34
Date: 2003-10-06
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Related works:
Working Paper: Decentralized job matching (2015)
Journal Article: Decentralized job matching (2011)
Working Paper: Decentralised Job Matching (2003)
Working Paper: Decentralized Job Matching (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269572

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269572

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