Fiscal Decentralization: A Political Economy Perspective

Ben Lockwood

No 269615, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper surveys recent contributions to the study of fiscal decentralization which adopt a political economy approach. It is argued that this approach can capture, in a variety of formal models, the plausible and influential ideas (increasingly, supported by empirical evidence) that fiscal decentralization can lead to improved preference-matching and accountability of government. In particular, recent work on centralized provision of public good provision via bargaining in a legislature shows how centralization reduces preference-matching, and recent work using "electoral agency" models formalizes the accountability argument. These models also provide insights into when decentralization may fail to deliver these benefits.

Keywords: Political Economy; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35
Date: 2005-01-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269615/files/twerp721.pdf (application/pdf)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269615/files/twerp721.pdf?subformat=pdfa (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269615

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269615

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().