Contracts with Endogenous Information

Dezsoe Szalay

No 269750, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: I study covert information acquisition and reporting in a principal agent problem allowing for general technologies of information acquisition. When posteriors satisfy local versions of the standard First Order Stochastic Dominance and Concavity/Convexity of the Distribution Function conditions, a Örst-order approach is justiÖed. Under the same conditions, informativeness and riskiness of reports are equivalent. High powered contracts, that make the agentís informational rents more risky, are used to increase incentives for information acquisition, insensitive contracts are used to reduce incentives for information gathering. The value of information to the agent is always positive. The value of information to the principal is ambiguous.

Keywords: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46
Date: 2006-12-14
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269750/files/twerp_780.pdf (application/pdf)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269750/files/twerp_780.pdf?subformat=pdfa (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Contracts with endogenous information (2009)
Working Paper: Contracts with Endogenous Information (2006)
Working Paper: Contracts with Endogenous Information (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269750

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269750

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().