Combinatorial and computational aspects of multiple weighted voting games

Haris Aziz, Mike Paterson and Dennis Leech

No 269772, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political science, neuroscience, threshold logic, reliability theory and distributed systems. They model situations where agents with variable voting weight vote in favour of or against a decision. A coalition of agents is winning if and only if the sum of weights of the coalition exceeds or equals a specified quota. We provide a mathematical and computational characterization of multiple weighted voting games which are an extension of weighted voting games1 . We analyse the structure of multiple weighted voting games and some of their combinatorial properties especially with respect to dictatorship, veto power, dummy players and Banzhaf indices. An illustrative Mathematica program to compute voting power properties of multiple weighted voting games is also provided.

Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269772

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269772

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