Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders

Francescsa Busetto, Giulio Codognato and Sayantan Ghosal

No 269864, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we study three prototypical models of noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders: the model of Cournot-Walras equilibrium of Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991), the model of Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Lloyd S. Shapley, and the model of Cournot-Walras equilibrium of Busetto et al. (2008). We argue that these models are all distinct and only the Shapley’s model with a continuum of traders and atoms gives an endogenous explanation of the perfectly and imperfectly competitive behavior of agents in a one-stage setting. For this model, we prove a theorem of existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: International Relations/Trade; Marketing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2008-09-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269864/files/twerp_866.pdf (application/pdf)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269864/files/twerp_866.pdf?subformat=pdfa (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders (2011)
Working Paper: Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269864

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269864

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().