Asymmetric Parametric Division Rules

John Stovall ()

No 270537, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: We describe and characterize the family of asymmetric parametric division rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims on a divisible homogeneous good. As part of the characterization, we present two novel axioms which restrict how a division rule indirectly allocates between different versions of the same claimant. We also show that such division rules can alternately be represented as the maximization of an additively separable social welfare function.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38
Date: 2013-04-23
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetric parametric division rules (2014)
Working Paper: Asymmetric Parametric Division Rules (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:270537

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.270537

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