Bundling without Price Discrimination

Andres Carvajal, Marzena Rostek and Marek Weretka

No 271001, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the optimal bundling strategies of a multiproduct monopoly in markets in which a seller cannot monitor and thereby restrict the purchases of buyers to a single bundle, while buyers have resale opportunities. In such markets, the standard mechanism through which bundling increases seller profits, based on price discrimination, is not feasible. The profit-maximizing bundling strategy is characterized, given the restrictions on pricing policies resulting from resale and a lack of monitoring. The welfare implications of optimal bundling are analyzed.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2010-05-26
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:271001

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.271001

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