An Economic Model of Strategic Electoral Rule Choice Under Uncertainty

Konstantinos Matakos and Dimitrios Xefteris

No 271283, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: We study electoral rule choice in a multi-party model where parties are o¢ ce-motivated and uncertainty over the electoral outcome is present. We show that when all dominant parties (parties with positive probability of winning the elections) have su¢ ciently good chances of winning, then they agree to change the PR with a more majoritarian rule. We identify the exact degree of disproportionality of the new rule and we prove that it is increasing in the expected vote share of the minority parties (parties with zero probability of winning). The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for such collusion in favour of a majoritarian rule are: a) the high rents from a single-party government, b) su¢ cient uncertainty over the electoral outcome and c) ideological proximity of the dominant parties.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34
Date: 2011-03
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Related works:
Working Paper: An Economic Model of Strategic Electoral Rule Choice Under Uncertainty (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:271283

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.271283

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