An Economist's Perspective On The Evolution Of Norms

Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson

No 292698, SSRI Workshop Series from University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute

Abstract: This paper seeks to close the gap between the models of man used by economists and sociologists. The problem of the evolution of social norms is identified with the equilibrium selection problem in game theory. Adopting such a view requires that sociologists be ready to regard social norms as being endogenously determined, and for economists to abandon the literature on refinements of Nash equilibrium in favor of an evolutionary approach. Even in simple situations like the Ultimatum Game, the consequences can be striking.

Keywords: Research; Methods/Statistical; Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 1993-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwssri:292698

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.292698

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