BILATERAL TRADING AND THE CURSE OF KNOWLEDGE: AN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS STUDY

Dale J. Menkhaus, Alla V. Yakunina and Owen R. Phillips

No 36127, 2001 Annual Meeting, July 8-11, 2001, Logan, Utah from Western Agricultural Economics Association

Abstract: This research investigates the impact of reporting different kinds of trade information to buyers and sellers in laboratory markets, for which exchange is made through bilateral bargaining. Results suggest that public information may improve the bargaining position of buyers relative to sellers when there is spot delivery. In some cases sellers earn less than in a no information baseline. There is evidence of a curse of knowledge for sellers in our information experiments when quantity traded for the entire market is known. The mandatory price reporting of all trades does not improve the income of sellers.

Keywords: International; Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:waealo:36127

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.36127

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